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ABSTRACT 
 
Terrorist groups, hijackers, and people hiding guns and knifes are a constant and increasing 
threat. Concealed weapon detection (CWD) has turned into one of the greatest challenges 
dures for detecting 
lled access settings 
rtunately screening 
in preventing some 
ded environments. 
alarms due to poor 
 areas and a robust 
ns are necessary.   
 
ely electromagnetic 
iscussed and a new 
st-effective weapon 
work in open areas 
orm magnetic field 
tal object carried by 
den changes in the 
that depends on the 
urrents generate a 
by the sensors. This 
dy the potential use 
eapon discrimination. Experimental work is also 
presented that confirms the theoretical predictions obtained from FEA.  It is shown that 
further work on signature extraction and signal processing needs to be done to build the 
weapon signature database necessary for classification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
facing the law enforcement community today. Current screening proce
concealed weapons such as handguns and knives are common in contro
such as airports, entrances to sensitive buildings and public events. Unfo
people in this way prior to entering controlled areas is ineffective 
weapons from getting through and also produces bottle-necks in crow
Also the screening technologies employed have a high rate of false 
discrimination capability. A reliable CWD that is able to work in open
method capable to discriminate between ferromagnetic weapo
This thesis reviews recent developments in the area of CWD using larg
methods. The advantages and disadvantages of these approaches are d
research direction in CWD is presented. This thesis proposes a co
detection system based on pulse induction technology which is able to 
without invading individual privacy. This approach employs a unif
generator to transmit pulses that cause eddy currents to flow in any me
people.  The induced eddy currents decay exponentially following sud
exciting magnetic field with a characteristic decay time (time constant) 
size, shape, and material composition of the object. The decay c
secondary magnetic field and the rate-of-change of the field is detected 
thesis introduces models based on finite element analysis (FEA) to stu
of the time constant as a signature for w
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
From year 2000 there has been an increased security threat in public areas. Today, terrorist 
 weapons are a constant and increasing threat. There is 
an immediate requirement for law enforcement and homeland security to identify concealed 
eneral public. This 
reatening weapons. 
he law enforcement 
Current security-detection systems, which include portals and hand-held devices for 
 are common in 
, and public events. 
 weapons. Current 
rk. They generally 
they cannot detect 
handgun or a bomb 
ar that screening 
ing secured areas is 
 almost impossible 
vailable today. To 
rs in controlled 
reets and any safety 
tal for law enforcement agencies to be able to detect and 
respond to weapons at a sufficient distance to allow officers to make decisions and take 
 
There must be reliable ways to detect and identify not only metal but also non-metallic 
weapons or other threatening objects that may be concealed under clothing or vehicles.  
 
groups, hijackers and people hiding
weapons, which may present a threat to official personnel and the g
involves suicide bomb vests, handguns, knife blades and other th
Concealed weapons detection is one of the greatest challenges facing t
community today [1].  
 
detecting concealed weapons such as handguns, knives and explosives,
controlled access settings like airports, entrances to sensitive buildings
The presence of a portal weapon detection system and hand held devices in a security check 
point warn in advance those individuals trying to hide threatening
security detection systems also need to be near an individual to wo
provide sufficient warning when it comes to detecting a knife, but 
weapons that can kill beyond arm’s reach. For instance by the time a 
vest is detected, it generally is too close to be dealt with safely. It is cle
people in this way using current security detection systems prior to enter
ineffective in preventing some weapons from getting through. It is an
task to achieve 100% success given the equipment screeners have a
detect concealed weapons requires not only simple metal detecto
environments as used today, but detectors from a standoff distance on st
critical environments. It is vi
actions that deal safely with the situation. 
Many approaches have been attempted since terrorist attack to different targets in USA of 
11th September 2001. The Department of Homeland Security established Homeland 
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) 
(http://www.dhs.gov/xres/grants/#1) to promote revolutionary techno
address homeland security vulnerabilities. It is an important component of the US response
to terrorist attacks of all kinds. In the meantime, the UK in common w
countries has initiated several research programs on crime preven
detection. It is a technological challenge that requires innovative 
technologies and image processing. 
 
logies that would 
 
ith other European 
tion including gun 
solutions in sensor 
This thesis has reviewed the recent progress of research and development of the CWD 
chester University, 
een Mary London 
working radiation 
on detection system 
 invading individual 
ther approaches at 
on-overlapping wavelengths could result in a reliable integrated multimodal 
sensing system. 
dividual methods at 
Passive (Earth field 
ologies. Chapter 4 
nts the theory for the proposed CWD, system description, FE model simulations and 
preliminary practical work.  In the last chapter the conclusions and future work are 
presented. 
 
technologies. As a part of the collaboration project partners (Man
Manchester Metropolitan University, Newcastle University and Qu
University) in the weapon detection research, this investigation is focused on providing a 
cost effective and reliable solution employing technologies with 
frequency within 0 and 1GHz. As a result of the research a new weap
based on pulse induction technology able to work in open areas without
privacy has been proposed. The eventual outcome of this work and o
several n
 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 will review and discuss in
different frequencies within the wide electromagnetic spectrum. Chapter 3 presents Finite 
Element (FE) based models for guns and knives characterisation using 
distortion) and Active (EM wave illumination) weapon detector techn
prese
 12
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
 
 the area of CWD. These methods largely use 
electromagnetic means including metal detection, magnetic field distortion, electromagnetic 
MMW), Terahertz 
ese approaches are 
orking at different 
the advantages and 
ctives are presented 
es  
n to X-ray imaging. 
ons in airports but, 
ssed in this review. 
 
2.1.1 Metal detection using Earth magnetic field distortion 
e Earth’s magnetic 
tic objects such as 
sitive magnetometers. Detector systems 
based on this technology exist in walk-through type devices and portable devices, currently 
been deployed as a 
permanently installed part of a secure entry system for courthouses. It is a walk-through 
type device that uses a series of vertically arranged gradiometers located on either side of 
its portal. A gradiometer consists of two magnetometers connected electrically in what is 
This chapter reviews recent developments in
resonance, acoustic and ultrasonic inspection, Millimeter waves (
imaging, Infrared, X-ray etc. The advantages and disadvantages of th
discussed and research challenges and perspectives are presented. The chapter is organised 
as follows: section 2.1 reviews and discuss individual methods w
frequencies within the electromagnetic spectrum; section 2.2 discusses 
disadvantages of these techniques; then research challenges and perspe
in section 2.3. 
2.1 Review of Current CWD Technologi
 
Current CWD approaches range from the EM spectrum based detectio
X-ray imaging has been used for border control and luggage inspecti
because X-ray is harmful to humans, this technique will not be discu
 
This technology is based on the passive sampling of the distortion of th
field. The local aberrations in the magnetic field produced by ferromagne
guns and knives can be detected by extremely sen
in development, which are called Gradiometer Metal Detectors [2]. 
 
The gradiometer metal detector system is a passive system and has 
called differential mode. The gradiometer responds to changes in the local magnetic field of 
the earth caused by a moving ferromagnetic object. The differential mode connection is 
required to reduce the effects of normal background fluctuations that would otherwise 
walk-through metal 
agnetic object and, 
cation of the metal 
etal objects so that 
on [3].  
 expensive if spatial resolution is an issue. The 
ic weapons. Obviously some metal 
 stainless steel and 
 to avoid vibration 
a-hardware to keep 
st. Portable devices 
 development [4,5]  
new application of 
usly collect data, 
 will be dictated by 
agnetic 
files of a variety of 
nal artifacts. These 
sence, location, and 
d signal processing 
lculate the probability that the collected 
magnetic signature correlates to a known database of weapon versus non-weapon responses 
using neural networks. In [6] a method to reduce false alarms was developed by using a 
Joint Time Frequency Analysis digital signal processing technique. 
cause false alarms. The gradiometer portal is very similar to a zoned 
detector. Each gradiometer pair responds to the presence of the ferrom
based on the magnitude of these interactions, the system displays the lo
object within the portal. The system responds to moving ferromagnetic m
placing the system near stationary steel objects will not affect its operati
There are some drawbacks in the gradiometer systems: 
1. The gradiometer systems become
resolution is dependent on the number of pair of gradiometers. 
2. Those systems can only detect ferromagnet
weapons are not made of ferromagnetic metals. Knives made of
thread weapons made of aluminium, copper or brass can not be detected. 
3. The system needs to be deployed in a permanent installation
which could lead to false alarms. It may be possible to use extr
tracking of position of the magnetometers, but it implies extra co
intended to be carried by officers or mounted on vehicles are in
 
CWD and Classification based on Earth’s magnetic field distortion is a 
existing magnetometer sensors. Sensors in the system simultaneo
providing a top-to-bottom profile of an individual. Reasonable suspicion
the location and magnitude of the recorded magnetic anomalies. A database of m
signatures has to be established through the collection of magnetic pro
weapons in differing locations and a number of non-weapon perso
signatures will later be used in the analysis that will determine the pre
potentially, type of weapons. Recent analysis schemes include advance
algorithms that perform pattern recognition and ca
 14
From 2003, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed a new generation of CWD 
system – a passive portal that senses disturbances in the ambient Earth’s magnetic field. It 
uses gradiometers to detect and locate position of metals. The CWD system uses 16 
 aperture. Data are 
collected, the data 
f a detected object. 
 the operator. It uses 
ependent upon the 
suspected weapons 
th of the measured 
 walk through gates 
magnetic gradiometer sensors, arranged on both sides of the portal
collected from each of the gradiometers, and the change in the magnetic field over ambient 
background is determined. After the individual sensor responses are 
from all of the sensors are processed to determine the location and size o
Figure 2.1 shows the graphical interface of the INL portal provided to
freeze-frame video capture technology and places filled circles — d
number of items detected — over the video image indicating where 
may reside on a person. The circle sizes vary in proportion to the streng
signal. This approach is normally used for a controlled environment e.g.
at airports.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. The CWD developed by INL [7]. 
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2.1.2 Inductive magnetic field methods 
The principle behind Electromagnetic inductive techniques for CWD is shown in Figure 2.2. 
5MHz generates a time-varying 
magnetic field around the coil. This field induces currents in a nearby metal object which, 
tal object or target. 
An alternating current over the frequency range of 5 kHz-
in turn, generate a time-varying magnetic field of their own. These fields induce a voltage 
in the receiver coil which, when amplified, reveal the presence of the me
 
Figure 2.2. The principle of EMI technique for CWD [8]. 
which are classified 
agnetic field generated by its excitation coil: Pulse induction (PI) and 
ich is turned on for 
ulsed eddy currents 
ulse induced in the 
tive objects show a unique time-decay response, so a signature library 
of these objects can be developed. When concealed metals are encountered, its time-decay 
signature can be compared to those in the library and, if a match is found, the object can 
potentially be classified [8].    
 
There are two broad categories of EM induction approaches for CWD, 
by the type of m
Continuous wave (CW). 
Pulse Induction (PI) detectors typically generate a transmitter current wh
a time, and is then suddenly turned off. The collapsing field generates p
in the target, which are then detected by analysing the decay of the p
receiver coil. Conduc
 16
Continuous Wave (CW) detectors generate a transmitter coil current which alternates at a 
fixed frequency and amplitude. Small changes in the phase and amplitude of the receiver 
voltage reveal the presence of concealed metal targets. 
cay response of the 
as Continuous Wave approach does this based on 
 of inductive metal detection methods by 
showing graphs of received signals with position on the horizontal axis. The scales are 
hange in decay rate 
e signal (red) when 
hange in phase and 
smitted signal (red) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. PI metal detection.  
 
Pulse Induction approach detects metal objects by analysing the time-de
pulse induced in the receiver coil, where
changes in the amplitude and phase of the receiver coil voltage.  
The following plots illustrate the two concepts
notional as the intention is just illustrate concepts. Figure 2.3 shows a c
of the signal received by PI detector (blue) with respect the referenc
passing over a metal located about position 10. Figure 2.4 shows a c
amplitude of the signal received by CW detector (blue) relative to tran
when passing over metal located about position 10. 
Position  
 17
 Figure 2.4. CW metal detection.  
 
  
Most of these detection systems are used in airports throughout the world for weapon 
 Weapon Detectors 
r. Pulsed magnetic 
ing screened to the 
ddy currents to be 
 strength decreases 
hey generate a low 
 the receiver coils with ferrite core to 
enhance the signal [9], and then processed into an electronic signal. 
 
Position  
detection to protect restricted areas of the airports. Active Walkthrough
like portal shown in Figure 2.5 belong to these systems. Figure 2.5 shows how signals from 
harmless objects are processed by active walkthrough metal detecto
fields produced by a transmitter (left panel) pass through the person be
receiver panel. As a pulse passes through a metal object it causes e
induced in its surface. Once the pulse passes beyond the object its field
and eddy currents in the metal starts to decay. As the currents decay t
intensity magnetic field. This field is detected by
 18
  
gh weapon detector. 
 
r from those based 
an not identify the position of an object, 
body has a small 
 to be able to detect 
 that are not of very 
high conductivity (in general non-metallic materials) [10] or of very small dimensions, the 
human body could give a stronger signal than the material. This would cause the material to 
pass undetected. Thus, such CWD devices do not have a great reliability.  
Figure 2.5. Cumulative signal effects in active walkthrou
Walkthrough weapon detectors based on inductive magnetic field diffe
on gradiometers as they are active methods and c
whereas the latter ones are passive and can locate a hidden object. 
CWD using this method has a problem with accuracy. A human 
conductivity thus the sensitivity of the detector cannot be high enough
the magnetic field coming from the body. When dealing with materials
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One of the most recent applications of inductive magnetic field approach is called Wide-
Area-Metal Detection (WAMD) [11]. This is a CWD system which enables the detection of 
metal and can be used to locate people carrying metal weapons in a crowd that may require 
rying magnetic field 
re. WAMD system 
te and measure 3D 
f the magnetic field 
tenna element and 
ay false rate for 
e that target 
etic field excitation 
The WAMD sensor system is based on Horizontal magnetic field (HMF) metal detection 
to generate three-
sing magnetic field 
 steerable magnetic 
eld into the primary 
etic field is rotated 
 , the 3DSMF sensor 
further investigation. WAMD use pulse induction to generate time va
and use the time decay of the magnetic field in the target as a signatu
sensors use a 3D steerable magnetic field sensor (3DSMF) [12] to crea
time decay response of the magnetic field of the object. The strength o
vector in 3D can be controlled by varying the current in each an
employing superposition of the fields of each antenna. In this w
classification decreases because most of target identification algorithms assum
is excited with uniform field, which differs by far from complex magn
of coil loops. 
 
antenna concept. This concept is based on sensors that attempt 
dimensional magnetic fields and measure the target’s 3D response by u
antennas that have complex spatial magnetic field distributions. The 3D
field sensor (3DSMF) (see Figure 2.6) orients the excitation magnetic fi
axis of the target. Once the primary axis is found, the antenna’s magn
into the secondary axis of symmetric objects. For no symmetric objects
measures the object’s response in 4π  steradians. The classification algorithm then tries to 
match the object’s 3D response to a target library. 
viewed. It is known 
netic field is in the 
horizontal magnetic 
feature, we create a practical approximation of an infinitive sheet current by placing closely 
spaced current-carrying wires in a plane (See illustration of three 3HMF in Figure 2.6). The 
result is a magnetic field with a relatively uniform horizontal shape.  
 
 
To better understanding the above concept basic physics need to be re
that, for an infinitive conducting sheet current in free space, the mag
direction perpendicular to the sheet current. Thus the sheet current is a 
field (HMF) generator or antenna. This magnetic field is constant. To take advantage of this 
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To conceptualize the 3DSMF sensor, we need only to imagine two single-axes HMF 
antenna co-located at right angles to each other. This arrangement forms a 2D horizontal 
field-generating antenna. The third dimension to the magnetic field is created by adding a 
6. Thus a magnetic 
ploying 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Block diagram of a 3D steerable magnetic field (3DSMF) sensor system [12]. 
 
2.1.3 Acoustic and ultrasonic detection  
 dependent on the 
and the shape and 
tion parameters for 
, wavelength of the 
wave emitted, and the emitted power. The antenna size and wavelength affect the size of 
the smaller object that can be detected. Acoustic/ultrasonic power will not travel in a 
vacuum; it is attenuated less as its travels in dense medium (solids and liquids) and is 
horizontal loop antenna to the two HMF antennas as shown in Figure 2.
field in 3D is created by varying the current in each antenna and by em
superposition of the fields of each antenna. 
 
y
 
 
 
The detection of weapons using acoustic and ultrasonic detectors is
acoustic/ultrasonic reflectivity of materials that make up an object 
orientation of the object. Basically, hard objects provide a high acoustic/ultrasonic 
reflectivity and soft objects a small reflectivity. The important detec
these technologies are size of the target, diameter of the detector antenna
x
z
Z-axis 
antenna 
Computer control 
( current control  
system) X-axis HMF antenna Y-axis HMF antenna 
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attenuated more as it propagates in the air. Also humidity in the air reduces the attenuation. 
The attenuation is frequency dependent; it is greater for higher frequencies. Therefore, there 
is a trade-off between the required spatial resolution and attenuation. Ultrasonic detectors 
creasing attenuation 
ting thick clothing 
pagate more easily through clothing 
d objects in general, 
ous hard objects. 
positive detections. 
 wave phenomena 
 being explored by 
S Department of 
 at 5m-8m distance. 
 
 
operate from 40 kHz until frequencies well below 1 MHz because of in
at higher frequencies. Acoustic detectors operate at audio frequencies. 
Ultrasonic (high frequencies) detectors [13] have problems penetra
whereas acoustic (low frequencies) detectors can pro
and “see” a concealed object. 
Conventional acoustic and ultrasonic based detectors are sensitive to har
and thus, it can not differentiate between weapons and innocu
Consequently devices based on these technologies produce many false-
Presently, there are hand held weapon detectors based on acoustic
operating at 1m -5m distance. A combination of radar and ultrasound is
JAYCOR, advanced-technology Company providing services to U
Defence.  The system produces an ultrasound image and can operate
 
ar acoustic method 
le. This technology 
small spot area on a 
 audio frequencies. 
encies: f1, f2, f1-f2, 
d to interrogate the 
subject with a beam able to penetrate clothing. Parametric acoustic arrays [15] can be used 
eapon can be based 
ation algorithms to 
hidden weapon.  In 
oes not involve ionizing radiation, is sensitive 
to metals and non-metals, and is able to penetrate clothing [13]. However, fast scanning is 
required for ultrasonic beams to focus on and find a target.  
From the combination of the ultrasonic/acoustic approach, a nonline
(NAC) for CWD has been developed [14].  Figure 2.7 shows the princip
uses ultrasonic beams of frequencies f1 and f2 to project sound onto a 
person at a distance and convert that energy probe from ultrasound to
The non linear interaction in the mix zone produces the following frequ
f1+f2. The difference frequency (f1-f2), tuned in the audio range, is use
to produce nonlinear acoustic effects and the detection of a concealed w
on signatures. The nonlinear acoustic method for CWD uses correl
perform patterns matching and classification to display the nature of a 
general this technique is harmless because d
 22
Acoustic beam
f1-f2
f1
f2
Detection
Ultrasonic beams
 
 
Figure 2.7. Non-Linear Acoustic CWD [14].  
 
onances  
 
ts” or signature to 
s are determined by 
he range 200MHz-
detector uses radar to sweep through this range of frequencies and record the 
resonant response.  
The radar return or resonance based scattering exhibits some features which makes it 
es: 
ering return is larger in the resonance region. 
 
the object. 
3. A few natural resonances characterize an object over a large frequency band. 
4. An object’s resonance patterns uniquely identify it within a class of objects. 
 
2.1.4 Electromagnetic res
This is an active technique which uses EM resonance as “fingerprin
distinguish weapons and nuisance objects. EM resonances in the object
its size, shape, physical composition. These resonances occur over t
2GHz. The 
 
attractive for object identification schem
 
1. Scatt
2. The natural resonances seen in a scattered return are independent of the orientation of
 23
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To induce a resonant response in an object, it is necessary to illuminate it in the frequency 
band of the natural resonances. The radar cross section (RCS) scattering falls in three 
regions, depending on the ratio of wavelength λ  to body size L. The three regions are 
Rayleigh, resonance and optics corresponding to λ  much higher than L, λ  proportional to 
L, and λ  much lower than L [16]. Figure 2.8 shows the RCS of a sphere of radius 
function of its circumference measured in wavelengths, ka =
a as a 
aλπ /2
wavelength number. RCS has been normalized to the projected area 
When the wavelength is much greater th sphere circumfe
proportional to 42 )(kaa , which shows that RCS increases as fourth power of frequency and 
sixth power of radius. When the circumference length is between 1 and
RCS exhibits oscillatory behaviour with several peaks which corresp
electromagnetic resonance of the sphere [17]. When the circumference i
a wavelength, the oscillatory behaviour fades out and the RCS is n
frequency and equal to physically cross section of the sphere.  
, where k is the 
of the sphere, 2aπ . 
an the rence, its RCS is 
 10 wavelengths the 
ond to the natural 
s large compared to 
ow independent of 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Enhancement of Radar Cross Section in the resonance region [17]. 
 
 
The theory of operation of this method is as follow. The target space can be illuminated by 
either a pulse or swept frequency source [2]. The signal reflected by objects in the target
space provides an electromagnetic signature (EM resonances), a unique spectrum, for that 
 determine whether 
or not objects in the target space are threat items. Neural network processing is used to
 person carrying the 
 be subtracted from 
This method has an operation range of 6.096m, allows the detection of concealed weapons 
posure and does not 
The problem found with this technique is noise corresponding to the signature of people. 
 when a weapon is
 very similar to one 
 
 
 
 high rate of false 
arm. 
s on May 2005 an 
y polarised, focused 
print on the suspect 
type of antenna makes the system less sensitive to the orientation 
of the concealed weapon. For the weapon classification, signal processing using Fourier or 
a Wavelet transform [20] is used.  
 
 
 
 
 
object. The object signatures are then compared to known signatures to
classify the difference between weapons and nuisance objects [18]. The
object will also exhibit a unique electromagnetic signature which must
the composite person-object signature. 
 
even behind a human body, operates at a safe limit power for human ex
invade privacy of individuals. 
 
Signatures of individuals vary from one to another and they also vary
present. Unfortunately, the signature of an individual with a weapon is
without a weapon and so there is a problem with classification and a
al
 
During 5th International Conference on Antenna Theory and technique
approach based on EM resonance was presented incorporating circularl
antenna arrays [19] to produce a very small common antenna beam foot
under surveillance. This 
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2.1.5 Millimetre waves (MMW)  
 
MMW based screening systems are basically of 2 types: passive and active. Passive sensors 
atever detects in local environment. In the RF spectral range, 
natural surfaces will emit different amounts of radiation depending on parameters such as 
 RF, which reduces 
ther sources in the 
 great advantage of 
e.  
Active sensors typically stimulate the environment by generating and emitting known 
 interact with them, 
erated signals have 
itted 
s of noise.   
 
 power to generate 
s less than that of a 
phone at 2009 is 
re wave technology 
 issues associated with use of ionizing radiation such as those seen with x-ray 
) sensors 
eflected by sources. 
bjects in the MMW 
spectrum as measured by the receiver. Clothing penetration for CWD is made possible by 
MMW sensors due to the low emissivity and high reflectivity of objects like metallic guns. 
 
simply observe and report wh
temperature and emissivity. In addition, metals are strongly reflective to
a metal surface’s emissivity and allows it to produce reflections of o
scene with the most significant being the sky. Passive sensors have the
producing valuable information without emitting any signals from peopl
 
signals. These signals propagate out to the objects or targets of interest,
and reflect or scatter energy back to the sensor. Because the self-gen
known properties, it is often possible to use signal processing to extract very weak em
target signals from competing source
According to safety views, MMW systems utilise very low radiation
detection capability. The system uses radiation power level 10,000 time
cell phone (maximum specific absorption rate (SAR) level of cell 
1.6~2W/kg depending on region (see appendix B). The use of millimet
eliminates
systems [21-23]. 
Figure 2.9 show how MMW images look. Passive millimeter wave (MMW
measure the apparent temperature through the energy that is emitted or r
The output of the sensors is a function of the emissivity of the o
 26
 
 
Figure 2.9. MMW images (QinetiQ imaging system) [24]. 
 
 
2.1.6 Terahertz (THz) imaging 
magnetic waves to 
ological agents, and 
n the THz range. 
ent and reflective to 
 effects on the THz 
pear transparent in 
. Ceramic guns and 
knives would partially reflect the THz signal. Skin, because of its high water content, 
would absorb nearly all T-Rays with the energy being harmlessly dissipated as heat in the 
first 100 microns of skin tissue. A THz reflection image of a person as shown in Figure 
 
The THz imaging technique is based on the use of THz electro
spectroscopically detect and identify concealed explosives, chemical/bi
metals through characteristic transmission or reflectivity spectra i
Generally, non-polar and non-metal solids are at least partially transpar
waves of frequencies 0.2 to 5 THz. Different materials have different
wave. Typical clothing items and paper and plastic packaging should ap
the THz regime whereas metals completely block or reflect THz waves
 27
2.10 would show the outline of clothing and the reflection of objects beneath, such as 
weapons or key chains, but the person’s skin would appear substantially dark [25]. 
 
 
 
 
arrying a gun [26]. 
 
 
waves can separate 
apon apart from its 
 is roughly 10 times better then that of Millimetre Waves 
(MMW), due to the smaller wavelength.  
lications including explosives, chemical 
 
 waves may seem 
e x-ray, but in actual fact, it is totally harmless as T-rays 
are non-ionizing - they do not alter molecules in the air or in humans. On the other hand, 
 
 
Figure 2.10. THz reflection image of a person c
There are some advantages of this technique which are attractive for CWD: 
1- The spatial resolution of THz waves is excellent for CWD. THz 
objects less than 1mm apart, which is more than enough to tell a we
surroundings. This resolution
 
2- Many materials of interest for security app
agents, and biological agents have characteristic THz spectra that can be used to
fingerprint and thereby identify these concealed materials.  .  
 
3- THz waves are non-dangerous. The penetrating ability of THz
harmful to health, similar to th
 28
x-rays can cause diseases such as cancer in humans if over-exposed and could cause
ge to the eyes if shown directly [25].  
aging has some issues which have to be eventually solved: 
y. THz sy
n
ed to br
 Euros [27]  
ct yet
 difficult to develop video output b
 
dama
 
However, THz im
concealed weapons is 
stems are 
troduction of near 
ing the cost 
. Using close 
ecause the scanning is still 
aging at stand-off 
 atmosphere absorb 
equencies only, leading to high attenuation at certain 
stems are tuned to 
systems have to be finalised and put into 
action, as they might be harmful at some specific conditions of exposure [29] or have 
legal implications.  
5- Privacy invasion issue, because T-ray can penetrate clothes. 
 
1- The feasibility of the use of terahertz imaging for the detection of 
questionable. The main issues are cost, processing and complexit
expensive because it requires special power sources. The recent i
infrared (λ=800nm) femtosecond laser as radiation source, has help
of such systems down below 50K
2- Though T-ray detection is already possible, it is not, by far, perfe
range imaging, it is still
slow, leading to a poor frame rate.  
3- The most significant limiting factor of the capabilities of T-ray im
range (3m to 100m) is the atmosphere which causes attenuation and turbulence to the 
waves [28]. However oxygen, water and other components of the
THz power at specific fr
frequencies (Figure 2.11).  Therefore, all stand-off THz imaging sy
use frequencies that are less attenuated.  
4- Proper guidelines for using these imaging 
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 cy [22]. 
odies as well as any 
°K. The wavelength 
nd the total power 
t on the size and emissivity of the body. Most infrared 
sensors are designed to have peak sensitivity near the peak emission wavelength of human 
 
Figure 2.11.  Atmospheric attenuation of THz rays against frequen
 
 
 
2.1.7 Infrared imaging 
 
Infrared imaging is another commonly used detection system. Human b
other material emit radiation provided they are at a temperature above 0
of the radiation peak is dependent on the temperature of the body, a
emitted from the body is dependen
body which is 10 mμ . This technology is normally used for a variety of nigh-vision 
rbed radiation heats 
mage of a concealed 
clothing is tight and stationary. For normally 
loose clothing, the emitted infrared radiation will be spread over a larger clothing area 
thereby significantly decreasing the ability to image a weapon. The difficulty in observing 
an infrared signal of a concealed weapon becomes worse as the weapon temperature 
approaches that of the body [30]. 
 
applications. 
Infrared radiation emitted by people is absorbed by clothing. This abso
the clothing and is then re-emitted by the clothing. Consequently, the i
weapon will be blurred, at best, assuming the 
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2.1.8 Hybrid millimetre-wave and infrared imager 
 
Hybrid millimetre-wave and infrared imagers are systems that exploit both mm-wave and 
ing subsystems are 
 fusion of the mm-
wave and infrared images results in a fused image [31]. 
 
The fusion process requires that the images be aligned properly (Registration). Before 
alignment each image is filtered to remove extraneous or noisy data and enhanced to 
augment certain image features. This process is illustrated in Figure 2.12. 
 
 
infrared imaging techniques. The images from these two separate imag
brought together algorithmically in what is called a fusion process. The
 
of the source 
t. Many of the 
tion based on 
ages. If 
rovide no 
useful information. In most situations, clothing will prevent acquisition of any information 
ther information on 
the concealed weapon than that provided by the MM-wave imager. MM-wave images take 
a few seconds to acquire and during this time the person must be stationary. The fused 
 
Figure 2.12. Image fusion [31]. 
 
 
The most straightforward approach to image fusion is to take the ave
images, but this can produce undesirable results such as a decrease in co
advanced image fusion methods involve multi-resolution image deco
the wavelet transform [32]. The fused data i
rage 
ntras
mposi
s the result of infrared and MM-wave im
on the concealed item, it will pthe infrared image cannot contain information 
on a concealed weapon. Consequently, the fused image provides no fur
 31
image may exhibit no more than a MMW image of the concealed weapon with a high-
resolution image of the surface of the clothing. However, the infrared image does facilitate 
location of human subjects, on which an object may be hidden, and this may accelerate the 
d 
er to screen people 
d in the floor of the 
trol system to steer 
nsmitter offers the 
advantage of illuminating the metal body in multiple directions and in any desired 
direction.  This might give evidence of electromagnetic resonances as well as extra 
information regarding the location of the target.  Hence, by finding electromagnetic 
resonances and keeping track of the beam as it scans, it should be possible to pinpoint the 
concealed weapon.  The system could operate as shown in Figure 2.13. The arrays of 
sensors are distributed in a grid pattern in order to show the location of gun/knife carrying 
people. 
 
 
subsequent process of detecting a weapon on the subject.  
2.1.9 Electromagnetic resonances and phased array 
 
A portable CWD systems based on finding electromagnetic resonances was develope
with relative good performance [17]. This concept can be adapted in ord
in an open area.  This novel idea is based around a phased array locate
scanning place, with a sensor array in the roof and a phase shifter con
the direction of the illuminating beam. Using a phased array [33] as a tra
Phased array antenna
Main direction of EM 
wave
Sensor array
Floor 
line
 
 
Figure 2.13. CWD system for open areas using phased arrays. 
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2.2 Discussion 
 
ary is illustrated in Figure 
o illuminate the 
ary of the 
 illumination of the 
space, portability and 
proxim
including the param
 
After reviewing different detection methods for CWD, a summ
 t
t CWD methods. Table 2.1 gives a brief summ
technologies being developed for CWD, including issues such as type of
target, type of energy used for interrogation of the detection 
ity of use. Table 2.2 gives a summary of the main issues of CWD methods, 
eter to be assessed, distance achievable, attenuation factor, depth of 
penetrability, and detectable weapons. 
2.14 and tables 2.1 and 2.2. Figure 2.41 shows EM spectrum used
detection space by differen
 
 
Figure 2.14. EM methods for CWD in the EM spectrum. 
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Table 2.1. Summary of the Different Technologies being developed for CWD. 
 
 
DESCRIPTION ILLUMINATION PROXIMITY PORTABILITY
ACOU 1  portable STIC OBJECT DETECTOR active far
WALK-THROUGH METAL OB
portable 
JECT 
activ
DETECTOR 
e near 2  
HAND HELD METAL OBJ
DETEC
ECT 
TOR 
activ portable e near 
IMAGING PORTAL active near portable 
METAL OBJECT LOCATOR passi portable ve far 
PULSE RADAR/ SWEEP FREQ
active portable 
UENCY 
DETECTOR 
 far 
THZ-WAVE  IMAGER active far portable 
MM-WAVE RADAR DETECTOR e portable  activ  far 
EM PULSE DETECTOR activ portable e far 
MM-WAVE IMAGER passive portable far 
IR IMAGER passive portable far 
1 More than three-meter-range 
Less that one-foot-range 
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Table 2.2. Summary of Main Issues of CWD. 
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There is a large gap in the current detector market.  Most pre-used gun 
intelligence and surveillance, along with targeted stop and search.  CCT
assist and is only really effective post event in providing identification 
detection is through 
V does not often 
and evidence, – i.e. 
it is not pro-active.  The police do not have a deployable portable detector that can 
unambiguously determine whether someone is carrying a gun. Such a device would assist 
them in producing more effective stop and search strategies providing the number of false 
 35
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positive ev earch effort into 
stic and 
ma ity detection 
at works at 
distances of  and it is easily 
 in a gun to 
 such as leather 
ve and active 
ore suited to 
has been developed 
been developed that 
.  At 94 GHz 
al.  It is difficult to 
n fusing images of 
ith some success. 
 
hat are capable of 
ion of THz through 
thing leads to poor 
 to the blurring out 
ncealed 
frared imager is clothing radiation absorption. 
The absorbed radiation heats the clothing and is then re-emitted by it, spreading over a 
 locate people in a 
crowd potentially carrying guns [39].  This technique utilises a pulsed magnetic field 
radiating across a large area, coupled with a receiver and CCTV to identify suspects.  It 
does rely on CCTV operators to observe potential suspects once an alarm is triggered.  At 
ents were kept within acceptable limits. Currently, res
developing a sensor is concentrated in large parts of the EM spectrum, plus acou
gnetic detectors. Focus now is on stand-off detection rather than proxim
le ultrasound concealed weapons detector th
 up to 6m.  There are reports of its partial effectiveness,
resent
ems
h passi
with portals or hand held metal detectors [34]. 
 
Wild [35] has developed a portab
deployable. However, this makes no use of the resonant cavities p
generate a unique gun signature and it is falsely triggered by non-gun it
wallets. Millimetre waves are known to penetrate clothing well, and bot
MMW imagers are being developed. These devices are generally large and m
portals at airports; although a passive MMW video surveillance camera 
[36].  Active through wall imaging systems, operating at 94 GHz, have 
are capable of identifying a gun in the hand of a suspect inside a room
microwave radiation is attenuated but not scattered by building materi
identify a weapon on MMW image, but some authors concentrate o
MMW and Infrared images to better reveal hidden guns [37] w
THz sensing and imaging systems are currently being developed t
forming 3D images of concealed weapons [38].  However, the penetrat
the atmosphere for stand-off detection and through some types of clo
results (e.g. a wool sweater produces diffuse scattering of THz, leading
of any concealed gun). Infrared imagers can potentially be used for detecting co
guns at night.  A challenge identified for in
large area and decreasing the ability to image the weapon.  
 
Research is also ongoing into Wide-Area metal detectors designed to
the moment there is a terahertz imaging system commercially available which is sold by 
TeraView Ltd, in Cambridge, UK. The imager uses photomixing technology [40, 41] with a 
femtosecond pulsed laser illuminating low temperature GaAs as Terahertz source. Finally, 
at utilise frequency 
age of a concealed 
cally examined the 
 THz  but these are 
suitable sensors for 
enges and Research Perspective 
For development of deployable concealed weapon detectors, three issues should be solved: 
distance is 
ations are required 
penetration 
equired for 
ove review 
ese issues, taking advantage of different CWD technologies, a combination of 
these is proposed.  
work is ongoing on portable and handheld MMW radar detectors th
modulated CW radar and complex signal processing to form an im
weapon [42].  A small body of work does exist that has systemati
opacity or otherwise of fabrics and other materials to microwaves and
not in a form that would easily assist the police in the deployment of 
given conditions. 
2.3 Chall
 
sensing distance, high penetration and weapon recognition. Enough 
for detection of metals and explosive under clothes or garments. Altern
is also required to detect targets beyond walls. Robust weapon recogn
various weather conditions and multiple objects or crowd environment
sensing 
required for open, outdoor environments e.g. high streets. High penetr
atively, 
ition is r
. The ab
has identified current detection methods are complementary approaches. No single 
approach can meet all the requirements for a comprehensive CWD. 
To solve th
 37
 
 
erspective of CWD. 
 
 
 challenges of a 
 a robust weapon 
 using complementary approaches. A comprehensive 
ents, and biological 
The spectra can be 
re complementary 
A tentative weapon 
entary CWD 
approaches in low and high frequency of EM spectrum (EM induction methods, Earth’s 
magnetic field distortion, and EM resonance) could be used to meet all requirements for 
comprehensive concealed gun/knife detection system 
Figure 2.15.  Diagram of challenges and research p
Figure 2.15 shows a diagram of the CWD research perspective arising from
deployable CWD. Large sensing distance, high penetrability and
recognition system can be achieved by
CWD system is expected working in this direction. 
To broaden and improve weapon recognition to explosives, chemical ag
agents, the characteristic THz spectra of these threats can be exploited. 
used to fingerprint and thereby identify these concealed materials. 
The literature survey has identified that current detection methods a
approaches and so the best approach is a combination of some of them. 
detection system is showed in the next diagram (Figure 2.16). Complem
Large
Sensi
 
ng 
Distance 
High 
Penetrability 
Perspective of Research 
Comprehensive CWD system 
Challenges of CWD 
system 
Robust 
Weapon 
cognition Re
Open and Outdoor 
Environments 
Complementary 
CWD 
approaches 
ensor Fusion) 
High penetrability: 
clothes, garment, walls 
(S
Robust under weather conditions, 
vironments, low false 
alarms 
crowd en
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n detection system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16. Diagram of a tentative weapo
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2.4 Conclusions 
 
A general concealed weapon detector collects data about the detection space and transmits 
n to the operator. Different sensor technologies are employed to capture 
different sort of radiating energy (magnetic field, electromagnetic wave, acoustic wave, and 
about objects in the 
cation regarding the 
as operating range, 
ethod 
thod can meet all 
 
 
 
 
 
 
this informatio
ultrasonic wave) that contains information about the detection space or 
detection space. Some technologies provide an image and other an indi
objects inspected.  
All technologies show advantages and disadvantages in issues such 
material composition of the weapon, penetrability and attenuation factors.  Each m
has some advantages over another.  It is clear that no single me
requirements for a comprehensive CWD system. Most of the methods
complementary.  
There are 
 described here are
several challenges to the development of a comprehensive concealed weapon 
on at a distance for 
eapons, explosive
s. 
New CWD systems need to be an amalgamation of the techniques mentioned above 
permitting a reduction in the number of false-positive trigger rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
detector. Three issues are the most critical and must be solved: Detecti
open and outdoor environments; High penetration for detection of w
under clothes, back or even walls, and a robust weapon recognition for various weather 
conditions, crowd environment and able to discriminate accurately threat/non-threat item
 40
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Chapter 3: FEA OF GUNS AND KNIVES DETECTION 
APPROACHES 
 
pplied to study the 
ty of CWD technologies working with radiation of 0-1Ghz frequency, 
 this chapter for the 
n. The first study is 
nce response under 
to study detection 
 barrels and knives 
hape cross sections 
  
Following the review of recent technologies related to CWD, FEA is a
detection capabili
which is the part of EM wave spectrum that this research is focus on. In
given EM spectrum, the study of two CWD technologies has been chose
done on technology based on sensing disturbances in the earth magnetic field and the 
second one on technology based on Radar Cross Section (RCS) resona
EM wave illumination. In each case the sensitivity of the method to external and inner 
characteristics, and orientation of the weapon is analysed in order 
capability. To simplify the analysis and without loss of generality, gun
have been modelled as uniform bars with different external and inner s
as shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the samples used in this test. Top row show different cross sectional of 
gun barrels. Bottom row show external shapes: tubular barrels (diameter 17mm), knife 
(0.8mm width) and square barrel (17mm side). 
 
Figure 1. Cross sectional of the samples. 
 
 
 3.
3.1 Earth Magnetic Field Distortion Method 
 
In this section the local disturbances in the Earth’s magnetic field (≈50 Tμ ) arising from 
knives is analysed.  
agnetic potential condition is applied to a 
finite volume (box: 1m x 0.5m x 0.5m). The top boundary is set to a magnetic potential of 
ro (see Figure 3.2). 
T
the presence of different sort of gun barrels and 
 
In order to emulate the Earth’s magnetic field m
1989A whereas the bottom boundary is set to a magnetic potential of ze
This setting corresponds to a vertical magnetic flux density of about 50μ .   
 
 
. 
density norm is measured along a line in the axial direction of the 
interrogating weapon located 20cm below this (see Figure 3.2). Potential use of the 
resulting magnetic flux density profile as distinguishable magnetic signatures is analyzed in 
the next sub-sections.   
 
Domain dimensions in metres 
20 cm 
Magnetic flux density 
measured along this axis 
Figure 3.2. FE model of CWD based on earth field distortion
 
 
Magnetic flux 
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3.1.1 Sensitivity to external shapes  
 
 
Perturbations in the earth’s magnetic field caused by weapons (bars for this model) with 
plitude pattern when magnetic flux density 
 
 samples. 
different external shapes show different am
norm is measured. It could be used as a magnetic signature for weapons with different
external shapes. Figure 3.3 shows Magnetic flux density pattern for three
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Figure 3.3. Magnetic flux density patterns of three samples with different outer section. 
 
 
 the same external 
rn. This means the 
nsitive to inner shapes and could be distinguish different classes of guns. 
Figure 3.4 and 3.5 shows Magnetic flux density norm distribution for gun barrels with 
different bore shape. 
 
3.1.2 Sensitivity to inner shapes  
 
Perturbations in the earth’s magnetic field caused by gun barrels with
shape but different bore show a slight difference in amplitude patte
method is se
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Figure 3.4. Magnetic flux density patterns of three samples with different inner section. 
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Figure 3.5. Target responses showing sensitivity to internal cross sectional change. 
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Figure 3.6. Signal response of a square bore barrel rotated 0 and 45 degrees. 
 
 
 
3.1.3 Sensitivity to orientation  
 
The earth magnetic field distortion caused by a square gun barrel at 0 degree and 45 
 axial axis is measured as shown in Figure 3.6. The signals 
measured for these two scenarios show slight different pattern, especially in the middle of
 the weapon whic
degrees rotation around its
axial length. Thus this technology shows sensitivity to orientation of
makes more difficult weapon classification process. 
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3.2 High Frequency EM Wave Illumination Method 
 
acterization 
 
The radar cross section (RCS) is a measure of sensitivity of an object to reflect illuminated 
model RCS response is used to 
ity of RCS respond 
cattered wave from 
MLs [43] are set up 
ee Figure 3.7). The 
0mm. The standoff 
3.2.1 Investigation of EM wave in weapon char
signal in the direction of the receiver. In the next 
characterize guns and knives under EM wave illumination. The sensitiv
at shapes (external and internal) and orientation is analyzed. Since the s
objects radiates in every direction, the ‘perfectly matched layers’ i.e. P
in cylinder coordinates. The modeling domain is 200mm by 200mm (s
frequency varies from 3GHz to 30GHz with a wavelength step of 1
distance is 90mm from the symmetric axis of gun barrel.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. FE model to investigate weapon response to EMW illumination. 
 
Measuring 
Weap
Surface: Scattered electric field, z component [V/m] 
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• Orientation of inner shape vs. RCS 
 
The orientation of non-circular bore and material of gun against RCS pattern is analyzed. 
 shape is defined as a square. Two orientations i.e. 0 
degree and 45 degree with respect to the radiation direction of incident wave are compared. 
 
Figure 3.8. RCS response change of orientation of bore gun barrel. 
 
 
To simplify the problem, the bore
The results are shown in Figure 3.8.  
 
2.5
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
x 1010
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
R
C
S
 
 
square bore; 0 degree; Brass
square bore; 45 degree; Brass
square bore; 45 degree; Steel
Frequency (Hz)
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                (a)   
  
                        (b) 
Figure 3.9. R rns of scattere  wave for (a) 0-degree rotated bore; (b) 45-degree rotated 
bore. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.8, the RCS pattern is insensitive to material and the orientation 
 
to interrogate the 
 
• Orien
t RCS pattern is 
45 degree 
e
in Figure 3.10.  
 
adiation patte d
 
changes of gun and barrel bore, respectively. It is because the conductive objects within
EMW is quite reflective and can hardly penetrate into the barrel 
orientation or shape changes of bore. 
tation of outer shape geometry vs. RCS 
gree and 
ct to the radiation direction of incident wave are compared. The results are shown 
 
The orientation of non-circular outer geometry of barrels agains
investigated. The square barrel is modeled. Two orientations i.e. 0 de
with resp
 48
3.5
 
Figure 3.10. RCS response to change of orientation of external shape gun barrel. 
 
 
               (a)         (b) 
 
Figure 3.11. Radiation patterns of scattered wave for (a) 0-degree rotated barrel; (b) 45-degree rotated 
barrel. 
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square; 0 degree
square; 45 degree
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Unlike comparison illustrated in Figure 3.8, in Figure 3.10, significant variations in RCS 
pattern can be found with the orientation of non-circular barrel changed. The reasoning is 
readily obtained by looking into the radiation patterns of scattered waves from the object. 
r wave illumination 
• 
 
pared. Three 
rrel with square 
ed in Figure 
nternal shape 
 contrast, the 
 scenarios.  
The wave pattern is entirely changed when the reflective surface unde
varies. Interestingly, the sharp section of reflective surface makes the resonance frequency 
of the entire object decrease when it is directly illuminated.  
 
Shape changes in inner and outer geometry vs. RCS 
 outer geometry of barrel is com
 ba
present
o the i
Hz. In
ther two
The RCS response to the shape of bore and
types of barrels are investigated: round barrel with round bore, round
bore, and square barrel with round bore. The comparison results are 
3.12.  From this Figure, it is noticeable that RCS pattern is insensitive t
variation of barrel. The RCS patterns for round bore and square bore nearly overlapped 
each other, though a little deviation can be found from 25GHz to 30G
pattern for square barrel is prominently distinctive from those for the o
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
x 1010
0
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1.5
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3.5  
round; round bore
square; round bore
round; square bore
Frequency (Hz)
R
C
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Figure 3.12. RCS response to barrel shapes. 
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3.2.2 Electromagnetic resonances    
Section 3.2.1 has shown that RCS profile can characterize obj
ctions will be illuminated with high fr
(200MHz to 20GHz), corresponding to resonance region of most common weapons 
ure 3.
mulatio
 
ects.  In this section gun 
equency EMW 
13 shows the 
n) and cross 
 
Figure 3.13. Cross section of gun barrels employed in the FE simulation. 
 
barrels with different cross se
according to the literature review (section 2.1.4). The same 2- dimension model of 3.2.1 is 
set to sweep through 200MHz-20GHz and record resonance respond. Fig
geometry the gun barrel (actually the cross section is employed for si
section profile for the simulations.  
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In Figure 3.14 three smoothbore barrels with different diameter and a square barrel has 
been illuminated with EMW swept from 200MHz to 20GHz. The results imply the samples 
can be differentiated in terms of the fundamental resonance (around 500 MHz) and the 
magnitude of RCS 
 
for each gun barrel. 
 
sions 
etallic objects in an 
agnetic field. This 
tive to geometry (external and internal shape) of the 
nology with high 
resolution (order of microtesla) which implies high cost. Another drawback is the 
difficult. 
s under EMW wave 
 
 region (200MHz-2GHz) [17]. Thus RCS exhibits resonance when objects 
are illuminated by EM wave with frequencies in resonance region. Study has shown the 
sensitivity of RCS to outer geometry but insensitive to inner geometry, orientation and 
material composition. 
Figure 3.14. The RCS values against frequencies 
3.3 Conclu
 
First study using FE simulations have shown that the presence of m
interrogation space causes local distortion of amplitude of the earth m
distortion field response is sensi
interrogated object and also to the orientation. 
Measuring earth magnetic field distortion requires sensor tech
sensitivity to the object orientation which makes the detection more 
 
Second study with FE simulations have shown the RCS of weapon
illumination can characterize weapons. The sensitivity of RCS for weapons is larger in
the resonance
 52
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Chapter 4: NEW PROPOSAL FOR THE DETECTION 
OF CONCEALED WEAPONS: EM WEAPON 
DETECTION FOR OPEN AREAS 
netic Weapons Detection and 
Identification 
The detection and identification of the proposed method is based on the scattered magnetic 
agnetic fields. The 
tions of Maxwell’s 
eller in 1985 [44].  
], selected results 
s approximated by a 
 
4.1 Theory for Electromag
 
 
field from a weapon when it is illuminated with low frequency electrom
computation of the scattered magnetic field is based on suitable solu
equations. The subject has been analysed in detail by Kaufman and K
Rather than repeat details of the developments of the authors in [44
pertinent with identification of CWD are described here. 
To simplify the computation of the scattered magnetic field, a weapon i
sphere with radius “a” and conductivity “σ ” and is irradiated with 
wave in the form of step pulses. When the pulse occurs, the weapon is illum
change in the amplitude of the magnetic field vector which is considered
an electromagnetic 
inated by a step 
 to be planar in the 
0 ”.  
iated with an electromagnetic wave in the form 
of step pulses from group of energized wires. 
vicinity of the weapon. The magnetic field in the vicinity of the weapon is defined as “H
Figure 4.1 shows a sphere of radius “a” irrad
Dimensions in metres
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Figure 4.1. Sphere with radius “a” and conductivity “σ ” irradiated with an electromagnetic wave in 
the form of step pulses. 
 
 
 
Using a quasi-static solution of Maxwell’s equations, it is found that the primary magnetic 
field around the sphere is increased by an amount due to currents induced flowing within 
the sphere and given by the following three equations: 
 
3
0
2 2 2
3 sin sq ta sKB a q eEφ
θ −∞= ∑
1 [ ( 1)( 2)]s sR k a K K= + − −
                (4.1) 
3
0
3 2 2
1
6 cos
[ ( 1)( 2)]
q t
a
R
s s
KB a eB
R k a K K
θ −∞
=
= + − −∑         (4.2) 
s
3
0
3 2 2
1
3 sin
[ ( 1)( 2)]
a
s s
KB a eB
R k a K Kθ
θ ∞
=
= + − −∑      (4.3) 
 
where aEφ , 
a
RB , 
aBθ  are the only components of the anomalous fields caused by currents 
induced in the sphere. These components are expressed in a spherical coordinate system 
t field as shown in 
 4.2.  
sq t−
centred on the sphere, with “R” being in the direction of the inciden
Figure
 
 
Figure 4.2. Components of the magnetic fields caused by currents induced in the sphere. 
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The other quantities in the equations are defined as: 
0/μ μ=K  (The relative magnetic permeability of the weapon)   (4.4) 
σμ/2kq =            (4.5) ss
απ /s  (s=1, 2, 3,∞ )     ks =    (4.6) 
and “
 
omponent is that of a sum of exponentially 
decaying transients. The asymptotic behaviour of these transients is now examined. During 
0), the expressions 
t” is time, following the initiation of the current step. 
The form of each electromagnetic field c
the early part of the transient response of the electromagnetic field (t?
for the anomalous magnetic field components are as follow: 
 
3 1/ 2
0 ( / ) cos [1 6 / ( ) ]
a
RB B a R tθ π α= −        (4.7) 
3 1/ 2
01/ 2( / ) sin [1 6
aB B a Rθ θ π= − 4.8) 
 
 determined by the 
l terms: 
/ ( ) ]tα       (
During the late part of the transient decay, the field is almost entirely
first exponentia
0τ
t−
cos
6 3
2
0 θπ
a
R eR
aBB ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=          (4.9)      
0sin
3 3
2
0 τ
θ θπ
a e
R
aBB
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=           (4.10) 
t
0sin
3 3
2
0 τ
φ θ
t
a eaaBE
−
⎟⎞⎜⎛= , where a220 πσματ =  is a time constant.  (4.11) 
ters: radius a=0.2m, 
0πτ R ⎠⎝
 
The computation of step-response decay curves of a sphere with parame
K=150, σ =3.54e6 S/m is shown in Figure 4.3. Four terms of equation (4.1) and the 
summation of first 8100 terms have been computed. The full step response decay curve 
shows three zones: early-time behaviour (flat), intermediate-time behaviour (power-law), 
and the late-time behaviour (exponential decay). 
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nse decay computed 
 
These results are the basis for the design of a highly effective weapons detection system. 
Each of the three expressions for field components is of the form of a product of two terms, 
Early-time 
Intermediate-time 
Late-time 
Figure 4.3. Four terms of Eq. (4.2) for s=1, 5, 10 and 50 (top). The full step-respo
for summations of 8100 terms of Eq. (4.2) [45] (bottom). 
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the first term of which involves only the geometry and magnitude of the primary field in the 
vicinity of the weapon, and a second term involving a time constant, but independent of the 
geometry and strength of the field incident on the weapon. Measurement of the time 
alse alarms due to 
agnetic field with 
ale (the slope of the curve is the time constant as shown in Figure 
 
Figure 4.4. Time constant from sensor signals in logarithm scale. 
constant provides a means for weapon detection which is free of f
variations in primary field strength. 
A time constant can be determined from a plot of the transient m
amplitude in logarithm sc
4.4.  
 
Sensor 
1τ
2τ3τ
to logarithmic scale 
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 The time constant can also be determined from the expression: 
0 / /
aa
R
a a
R
BB
B t B t
θ
θ
τ = − = −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂         (4.12) 
 
Weapons have a r not conclusions 
for simple geometries extend to more complicated shapes. Kaufman and Keller (1985) 
 the scattering time 
q ,   
where “ epends on the shape of the conductive body.    (4.13) 
The expression shows the potential of using the time constant in identifying a specific 
e size, shape and 
gnetic field. Time 
ld or the distance of 
can be classified at 
 magnetic field can 
be determined. 
 is by illuminating 
easuring the time 
 on the body of a 
ight obscure that of 
de by substituting 
ctivity-permeability 
ape of the metallic 
object the greater will be the form factor).  With these numbers, the order of magnitude 
estimate for the time constant of the hypothetical weapon is 1 millisecond. In the human 
body, flesh and bone are conductive and the conductivity-permeability product for a human 
complex geometry, so a question arises as to whether o
extended the analysis to axial symmetry and arrive at an expression for
constant as follows: 
a /20 σμτ =
q” d
 
weapon of an even more complicated shape. All weapons of the sam
metallic composition will be characterised by a scattered electroma
constant will be the same, no matter what the strength of the incident fie
the weapon from the transmitter or the receiver array. Thus weapons 
least within the precision with which the time constant of the decaying
 
The appropriate way to determine the time constant for a real weapon
that weapon with an electromagnetic field using step pulses and m
constant from the decaying field. Usually the weapon will be carried
person. However the time constant associated with the human body m
the weapon. An estimate as to whether this will happen can be ma
numbers in the expression (4.13). For example, assume that the condu
of the steel in a weapon is of the order of 1 2SHm , the radius of the sphere enclosing a 
weapon is 0.1m, the form factor “q” is 10 (the more convoluted the sh
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body is of the order of 210SHm . Thus the corresponding order of magnitude time constant 
for a human body is 0.1 sμ . Although these are only estimates, the two time constants are 
so different that there is no likelihood that one will obscure the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 to sustain the eddy 
epends on the size, 
he decay currents 
 field is detected by 
tion.  The arrays of 
ted within sensing area in a grid pattern in order to show the location of 
gun/knife carrying people. 
 
 
4.2 Proposed Concealed Weapon Description  
Generator (UMFG), consisting of a group 
of parallel current carrying cables located below a walking surface to produce a horizontal 
magnetic field and arrays of magnetic field sensors located within the sensing area as can
ue. Currents in the
he sensing object to
 Faraday’s law, the
collapsing magnetic field induces an electromotive force in the metal target. This force 
The system comprises a Uniform Magnetic Field 
be seen in Figure 4.5. The system works based on pulsed-EMI techniq
UMFG flow for a sufficiently long time to allow turn-on transients in t
dissipate. The current in the cables are then turned off. According to
causes eddy currents to flow in the metal. Because there is no energy
currents, they begin to decrease with a characteristic decay time that d
shape, and electrical and magnetic properties of the metal object. T
generate a secondary magnetic field, and the time rate-of-change of the
magnetic field sensors. The time decay response is used for classifica
sensors are distribu
 60
 
 
osed CWD system. 
esign 
 
The new proposition of CWD system comprises: 
G,  Switches and Pulse control  
• sor arrays 
 
 
 classification subsystem.  
 
4. Operator interface. 
Figure 4.5. Functionality of the prop
 
4.3 Proposed D
 
1. Metal detector subsystem. 
• UMF
 Sen
2. Control subsystem.  
3. Detection &
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Figure 4.6. Proposed CWD structure
 
 
4.3.1 Metal detector subsystem 
or (UMFG) 
 
g sheet current, the 
2/vB
. 
 
• Uniform Magnetic Field Generat
It is known from basic physics textbooks that for an infinite conductin
field in the direction parallel to the sheet is given by:  
0μ=           (4.14) 
 the current density in the sheet and 0Where v is μ is the permeability of free space (μ0 = 
e sheet current is a 
d by closely spaced 
allel current carrying wires. The important feature of (4.14) is the fact that the magnetic 
 shown in the next 
 wires 
(see 4.3.1). These wires form the active surface of UMFG. The UMFG consists of a single 
cable AWG10 (American Wire Gauge, 2.58 mm diameter) wiring around a box forming 
rectangular 20 loops (3 m x 0.60 m), 2cm between loops in the way showed in Figure 4.7.  
 
4π×10−7 N·A−2).   
The magnetic field perpendicular to the sheet is zero. It implies that th
horizontal magnetic field generator. Sheet current can be approximate
par
field is constant, a feature that improve weapon detection as it will be
section. 
An approximation to a sheet current is created by a series of closely spaced parallels
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 Figure 4.7. Magnetic field rom active part of UMFG (top plane) and return path 
(bottom plane). 
 
e 180ns) 
 excitation field is 
owever the primary 
field is reduced by the superposition of the opposite magnetic field generated by the return 
path (bottom of the box). The effective magnetic field covering area is shown in Figure 4.8. 
Electronics 
Btop 
Bbottom 
s in 
I 
I 
Dimension
 
covering area f
 
 
In Figure 4.7 the cable is connected to high-speed electronic (turn-off delay tim
switches. A single power supply provides current to the UMFG. The
generated by the plane of wires closest to the ground (top of the box). H
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g is added to the 
ing is to route return path 
 
Figure 4.8. Effective magnetic field covering area. 
in
agnetic shield
to the sides of the box instead of the bottom as shown in Figure 4.9. 
 
Magnetic field covering area will not be reduced if magnetic shield
return path.  An alternative solution without using m
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 Figure 4.9. Routing the retu e sides of the box maximizes the effective magnetic field 
covering area. 
witches are power 
f the switches. The 
 generator (LM555 
itching a power MOSFET 
cal failures the low 
power circuit (pulse generator) and MOSFET are decoupled by an opto-isolator. 
To protect the MOSFET from back electromotive force (EMF) a flywheel diode series with 
three Zener diodes are connected across the ends of UMFG wires. Besides protecting the 
MOSFET the set of diodes reduce considerably the switch off time whose effect on target is 
to enhance the signal back to the sensors.   
 
rn path to th
 
 
The current in the UMFG is controlled by the electronic switches. The s
MOSFETs (IRF150). A pulse generator controls the opening/closing o
circuit is shown in Figure 4.10. The circuit consists of low power pulse
set a 20Hz, 10% duty cycle in order to not overheat the wires.) sw
(IRF150) in order to drive 6.7A into the UMFG. To prevent electri
 65
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The proposed weapon detection system needs to cover a larger area. To accomplish that an 
option could be to use a single UMFG with a longer wire; however doing this maximizes 
the magnetic field collapse time, inducing weaker eddy currents in the metal and making 
detection difficult. In the time domain, the strength of the excitation magnetic field is 
dependent of rate of change of its collapse time. The decay of the excitation magnetic field 
is governed by the decay of the current in the wires after the switch is opened. Thus a way 
to use a longer wire in which currents decays in a short time needs to be found.   
Ignoring capacitive effects, the decay time on the UMFG is given by L/R, where L is the 
inductance of the loop and R is the resistance of the loop. For this application, L can be 
minimized using several shorter loops. L decreases more than R so the reduction of R does 
not prevent the minimization of the time decay.  
For the proposed weapon detection it is planned to use five of UMFG (144mx5) connected 
in parallel as shown in Figure 4.11 with sensor arrays in between to cover an area of 3x3 m. 
This block area could be used as a module for a larger system. In the whole system each 
UMFG has its own switch because each UMFG will be excited sequentially as shown in 
Figure 4.12 by a pulse controller. It improves the detection by giving location of the target 
and avoiding exciting other metal in the vicinity. 
Power Source
PG1 (Switch 1)
PG2 (Switch 2)
PG3 (Switch 3)
PG4 (Switch 4)
PG5 (Switch 5)
Sensor Array
Sensor Array
Sensor Array
Pulse Control
Sensor Array
 
 
Figure 4.11. Layout of a block of intended CWD system including five UMFG. 
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Figure 4.12. Ti of switch trigger signal (LM555 set a 20Hz, 10% duty cycle). 
 
 
• Advantages of uniform excitation magnetic field 
There are some s of detection and classification according to the way 
that targets ar ld be illuminated by magnetic field generated by a large 
coil (3m diam   Figure 4.13 shows streamlines of magnetic 
field density from om closely spaced current carrying wires (b) 
me diagram 
 advantages in term
e excited.  Targets cou
eter) or group of parallel wires.
 a loop (a) and those fr
 69
  
Figure 4.13. Cross sectional view of magnetic field from a coil loop (top); Cross sectional view of 
magnetic field from UMF (bottom). Current flow into the paper. 
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Illumi  process 
[1] 
extended target m
decay tim  of the two 
dipole tim e constant a
nation of objects with uniform magnetic field makes easier the classification
and provides a strong source of illumination. 
Improvement in target classification  
The advantages of exciting an unknown metal with uniform magnetic field can be better 
explained by a description of the basic physics of the problem. Consider a simplified 
odel made of two separated dipoles as shown in Figure 4.14. Each dipole 
e constant is modelled as a single exponential decay and the sum
e decays is the target’s decay signature. Dipole 1 has a decay tim τ  
and amplitude A a  and dipole 2 has a decay time constant bτ  and amplitude A b . This 
signature is an inherent property of the target and is used for classification. Now let’s 
consider the case as showed in Figure 4.14a, where exciting the target with a spatially 
varying (non-uniform) magnetic field that excites the two dipoles with different magnetic 
fields, B1 and B 2 , the target signature is dependent on the excitation field and is not simply 
the sum of two exponential decays. This potentially makes target classification more 
difficult. In Figure 4.14b, the excitation magnetic field is uniform (B u ) over the target. In 
this case the theoretical response of the target is preserved because the magnetic field can 
be factored out of the target response equation. So target signal expression still contains 
endent of the strength of the uniform magnetic field. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Magnetic field uniformity and Target signal response [12]. 
1 2
Target signal
exp( / ) exp( / )a a b bB A t B A t
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τ τ
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[2] Slow reduction of field strength with distance 
The uniform magnetic field generator has a stronger magnetic field intensity compared to 
that of conventional loop coils as a function of distance from the plane of the magnetic field 
 Uniform magnetic 
field generator UMFG (1m x 3m) to Bz of a loop coil (1m of diameter) versus distances 
gnetic field for each case has been normalized to one at 
ance.  
 
Figure 4.15. UMFG and Loop Coil. 
 
generators [11]. Figure 4.16 shows a plot that compares Bx from the
from the plane of UMFG. The ma
the distance of 10cm to show the relative field intensity fall-off with dist
 
 
Bx
Bz
xB
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Figure 4.16. Magnetic field from UMFG and a loop coil. 
 
• Sensor array 
 
The magnetic field strength for the proposed weapon detection system is in the order of 
microtesla (10 2−  gauss). Looking on table 4.1 there are plenty of magnetic field sensor 
technologies which can cope with this requirement [46]. Some sensor technologies have 
more advantages than others in term of minimum detectable field, cost and circuit 
complexity. For this research three magnetic sensor technologies could be suitable: search 
coil, hall-effect devices and magnetoresistive devices.  
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Table 4.1. Magnetic Sensor Technology Field Ranges [46]. 
 
Magnetic Sensor Technology Detectable Field (Tesla) 
1210−      810−         410−        010         410  
1. SQUID1        
2. Fiber-Optic       
3. Optically pumped       
4. Nuclear-procession       
5. Search coil       
6. Anisotropic Magnetoresistive       
7. Flux-Gate       
8. Magnetotransistor       
9. Magnetodiode       
1     0. Magneto-Optical sensor    
11. Gian magneto-impedance       
12. Hall-effect Sensor       
          1 Su erconductive Quantum Interference Device 
 
Table 4.2 shows an analysis of capabilities of those sensor technolog
work. 
Table 4.2. Perform
 
p
ies for the present 
ance of Sensor Technologies. 
Characteristics Search coil Hall device Magnetoresistive (AMR)
Resolution (T)  10
−  410−  10 10−  12
Cost1 Low Moderate2 High 
Size ~cm ~mm ~mm 
Temperature Stability Good Poor Acceptable 
Input Power 0 ~mW ~mW 
Cost depends on the scale of manufacture; the relative cost here is estimated for large-scale manufacturing. 
Relative cost include bias magnet. 
1
2
In the proposed weapon detection the array of sensors are distributed within sensing area in 
a grid pattern in order to show gun/knife carrying people location as shown in Figure 4.17. 
3 m
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ray distributions for the proposed CWD system. 
 
4.3.2 Detection & classification subsystem  
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The eddy excited in etal body take the form of an ex
tr ly fo dden chan es in 
curve can be used to ob
Keller, 1985) that e constant de  inde nt of the strength of the field incident
ial compositio
n a library of potential threat metal objects can be developed. When a
metal body is encountered in the field, its time decay response can be compared to th
the library, and if a match is found, the metal body can be classified. If an unknown ta
tim cay is pende
magnetic field and highly dependent on the size, shape and mater
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response signature is significantly different from any weapon signature in the library, the 
target can be considered a clutter.  
osed system each UMFG and sensor array needs to be excited and read 
ation of the suspect 
 
In the prop
Figure 4.18. 
 
independently following a given order. This facilitates finding the loc
and saving memory and computation time for classification. This process is shown in 
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ation. 
One of the proposed algorithms for the determination of a time constant consists of 
transformation of the signal strength by using the logarithm of the signal. With this 
transformation, an exponential decay curve appears as straight line, with the slope being the 
 
Figure 4.18. Scanning of interrogation area for detection and classific
 
 
• Extraction of time constant decay 
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time constant. The time constant (slope of the line) can be extracted by curve fitting
fit one –parameter linear function) of the transformed data. This process is illustra
Figure 4.19. 
 (best-
ted in 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.19. Proposed algorithm for extraction of the Time Constant. 
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4.3.3 Control and operator interface subsystem  
 
The control subsystem gives the sequence order for the UMFG excitation, reads the sensors,
s with the operator 
giving the result of the detection and classification. 
 
4.4 FEA Simulations 
 
To test the proposed method, a simplified 3-D model in COMSOL 3.3 (finite element 
analysis and solver software package) as shown in Figure 4.21, has been used. The model 
consists of a UMFG (20 parallel cables laid on the floor, 3cm in between) for transmitting 
step pulse of current of 10A, 1.5ms width pulse, falling time 170us, causing eddy currents 
to flow in a nearby metal object. The eddy currents scatter a signal that will be detected by 
a three-axis magnetic sensor array (hall or magneto-resistive sensors) placed between the 
cables. Parameter values used in the model are based on previous studies and simulations 
performed to achieve a strong enough magnetic field. Simulations have been run to analyse 
the sensitivity/insensitivity of the target response to changes in shapes, orientation, sizes 
 
and material composition of interrogated objects. A study of target response at different 
stand off is also included. 
4.4.1 Sensitivity to outer shape 
 
Four different samples: Gun1 with smooth barrel and smooth bore, Gun2 with square barrel 
and smooth bore, and two knives with different cross section as showed in Figure 4.20 are 
tested respectively. In Figure 4.22, the magnetic flux density (B) along z-axis and y-axis is 
sensed from a distance of 35cm from the object along perpendicular line between object 
and floor. Following the intended algorithm for time constant extraction, the logarithm of 
magnetic flux density is plotted against time in order to show more clearly the time 
constant for each interrogated object. 
and performs the signal processing for the detection and classification.  
Set of alarms, location indicator, video monitors and displays interface
 78
 
Figure 4.20. Samples for test. 
 
Pick up signal point
target
 
 Figure 4.21. 3-D Model (dimensions in metres). 
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Figure 4.22. Scattered magnetic field on y-axis (top) and z-axis (bottom). 
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4.4.2 Insensitivity to object orientation 
 
In the following test a gun (steel) is oriented in three positions as seen in Figure 4.23. 
Results showed that even if the amplitude of the signal changes, the time of decay stays 
invariant. Also measurements have been taken at different distance from the gun (15cm and 
35cm as shown in Figure 4.24) to show how the time constant is independent of the 
strength of the field incident. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.23. Model to test sensitivity to weapon orientation (domain dimension in metres). 
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Figure 4.24. Scattered magnetic field sensed from a distance 15 cm (top) and 35 cm below the gun 
(bottom). 
 
 
 
 
4.4.3 Sensitivity to size  
 
 
Three guns of the same type but different sizes are tested. In this test a coil is added to the 
model to sense the time decay of induced current in the target caused by the abrupt change 
of the magnetic field. Results in Figure 4.25 show that time constant is a function size of 
the sample. Because large metallic objects store more energy than small ones, the time 
decay of collapsing magnetic field (or induced current in the coil) takes longer. This 
characteristic could be potentially used to discriminate object size. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.25. Model to test size sensitivity. 
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Figure 4.26. Time constant response to size of guns. 
 
 
 
4.4.4 Sensitivity to material composition  
 
The same sample as Figure 4.25 with different material composition (copper, iron, and 
steel) was tested. The time constant profile is clearly different for each case confirmi
potential of the ne  identify objects with a different m
composition. 
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 Figure of steel, copper and iron. 
 
 
off  
 
rget (aluminium) is 
) from the sensor as 
n Figure 4.28. The signal measured by the sensor without the metal object has been 
subtracted from all measurements. 
 
 
4.27. Time cons nt profile of a gun made ta
4.4.5 Target response to stand 
The measurements are taken in a point located over the cables. The ta
placed at different distances (15mm, 25mm, 35mm, 45mm and 55mm
shown i
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 rent stand off. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.28. Model to measure target response at diffe
 
 
Figure 4.29. Signal amplitude of the target at different stand off. 
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Figure 4.29 shows how peak amplitude of induced current in a search coil is proportional to 
target location. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.30. Gradient of target signals response at different stand off. 
 
 
 
From Figure 4.29 and 4.30 it can be seen that even though amplitude of the signal response 
changes at different stand off, the time constant remains invariant. This simulation proves 
that time constant is independent of the strength of illuminating and scattering magnetic 
field.  
 
Tests have shown that time decay measurements obtained from simulations of the proposed 
weapon detection system are sensitive to the shape, size, and material composition of the 
target. Furthermore, the time decay profile is independent of the strength of the illuminating 
magnetic field. Measurements taken in any direction also sho  an agreement in time decay 
profile. All the mentioned are requirements of a comprehensive CWD system, so the results 
look promising in terms of effectiveness and reduction of false alarm level. 
 
w
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4.5 Experimental Work 
 
4.5.1 Driver circuit for UMFG 
ve the detection the UMFG needs to induce eddy currents in the target with 
sufficient strength to generate magnetic fields strong enough to be measured by sensors. 
UMFG has to excite the target with a magnetic field with strength and rate of change high 
enough to sense distance targets and induce strong eddy currents. Thus UMFG needs to 
carry enough current and switch faster to meet those requirements. 
Based on FE simulations the UMFG needs to carry a current 6~10A and switch in around 
250us to induce strong enough eddy currents in the target such that the magnetic field  back 
to the sensors is in the order of T
 
To impro
μ . A driver circuit for the UMFG consists of a MOSFET 
IRF150 that can carry the required current and a step pulse generator to switch the 
MOSFET at a frequency adjusted to the acquisition and signal processing time of  available 
hardware (in this research the frequency used is 20Hz). 
Figure 4.31 shows the first design for the driver of the UMFG. The pulse generator (low 
power circu
electrically decoupled by an opto-isolator to prevent electrical failures. The pulse generator 
 
 
 
 
it) and the MOSFET (high power circuit) connected to the UMFG are 
consists of timer LM555 set at 20Hz, 10% duty cycle in order to not overheat the wires.  
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To prevent back electromotive force (EMF) in the MOSFET a flywheel diode is connected 
across the wire. The pulse signal obtained from the 10 turn cable has a fall time of 1.2ms 
and amplitude 6.7A. As explained before th f in less 
than 250ms to induce high eddy current density in the target. The clamped voltage and the 
current are shown in Figure 4.32.  
 
e MOSFET needs to be switched of
16
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Figure 4.32. Current and Voltage in UMFG during one excitation pulse (design1). 
 
 
To speed up the fall time a modification in the circuit was done (Figure 4.33). Three Zener 
diodes were added to the fly-back diode in order to reduce energy stored in the inductance 
L and allows it discharge faster. The fall time is now 200us with amplitude 6.7A. The 
e is raised but not enough to damage the MOSFET (IRF150 has a 
VDss=100V). Voltage and Current in the new design are shown in Figure 4.34. 
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Figure 4.34. Current and Voltage in UMFG during one excitation pulse (design2). 
  
 
 
Changes in transient voltage and current of UMFG as a consequence of adding three Zener 
diodes series with original fly-back diode are shown in Figure 4.35 and 4.36. Figure 4.35 
shows the increasing of the reverse transient voltage as price to reduce switch off time. 
Figure 4.36 shows the substantial reduction of MOSFET turn off time after design changes.   
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Figure 4.35. Back EMF reduction comparison between design 1 and 2. 
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Figure 4.36. Current fall time comparison between design 1 and 2. 
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4.5.2 Testing of the proposed weapon detection. 
 
Experimental tests were developed on an UMFG (3 m x 0.60 m) placing metallic objects at 
30 cm over the centre of the UMFG plane and reading the measurement of sensors placed 
 
 
over the plane and below the targets. The tests were performed in an environment under 
EM interference (electronic equipments) and noise (nearby metallic objects in the
illumination area) to resemble the worst working scenario of the proposed CWD system.  
• Metallic target response in search coils. 
 
ed using a search coil device as showed in Figure 4.37.
evice allows choosing three loops arrangements. Previews test with each 
op showed different sensitivity. The best response was obtained with 11.79
The following tests were perform
This search coil d
individual lo Ω , 
2.525mH loop.   
 
 
 
Figure 4.37. Search coil device. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. Coil parameters. 
 
ductance (mH)    Resistance (Ohms) Diameter (mm)    In
Large coil 150 4.414 17.833 
Medium coil 120 2.525 11.796 
Small coil 70 1.571 48.158 
 
 
 
First test: sensitivity of time constant to target orientation 
 
e constant at target orientation is analyzed. The metallic 
e positions. Search 
 the search 
ence of target (red) is also included for reference.  
 
In the first test the sensitivity of tim
base of a solder kit is placed 30cm over the UMFG and rotated in thre
coil responses are plotted in Figures 4.38 and 4.39. The signal measured from
coil in abs
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Figure 4.38. S lder kit responses at different orientation. 
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 kit responses in logarithm scale. 
 
. 
From Figure 4.38 it can be seen that target response for each position (blue curves) has 
similar transient profile. A zoomed view of curves (Figure 4.39), plotted in logarithmic 
scale, shows a first part of the transient (500-560 s
 
Figure 4.39. Zoomed views of solder
μ ) dominated by target signals with 
linear profile. The second part of the transient (after 560 sμ ) shows coupled EM 
interference which is dominant because the target has already released most of the stored 
energy. Gradient of the curves in first part of the transient correspond to time constant 
which is similar for the threes positions. It probes the insensitivity of time constant to target 
orientation.   
 
Second test: sensitivity of time constant to target shape 
 
In this test, the response of samples with differentiated geometry characteristics (a base of 
solder kit, a mobile, and three pliers) is analysed. Measurements were taken at 30cm over 
the UMFG. Search coil responses are plotted in Figure 4.40(top). The signal measured from 
the search coil in absence of target (red) is also included for reference.  
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Figure 4.40. Target response signals from search coil (top). Zoomed view in logarithm scale (bottom). 
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Figure 4.40 (top) shows that each sample response has different transient profile. Like first 
test the zoomed view of curves (Figure 4.40(bottom)), plotted in logarithmic scale, shows a 
first part of the transient (500-550 sμ ) dominated by target signals with linear profile and a 
dominant EM interference in the rest of the transient. Now gradients of the curves in first 
part of the transient are remarkably different, which allow classifying samples.  Thus this 
test probes the sensitivity of time constant to target shapes. 
 
 
• Metallic target response in magnetoresistive sensors 
 
Anisotropic Magnetoresistive (AMR) sensors convert magnetic fields to a differential 
output voltage, capable of sensing magnetic fields as low as 30 μ gauss. Most low field 
magnetic sensors are affected by large magnetic disturbing fields (>4~20 gauss) that may 
lead to output signals degradation. In order to reduce this effect, and maximize the signal 
output, a magnetic switching technique can be applied to the AMR bridge that eliminates 
the effect of past magnetic history [47]. 
The circuit in Figure 4.41 is the implementation of the switching technique to maximize 
sensitivity of AMR before UMFG illuminates the target. The circuit operates sending 
master pulsed signal of 14.5Hz, 9.88% duty cycle (first LM555 working as astable) to drive 
a pulsed current of 4A through P and N Darlington into the AMR coils. This pulsed current 
realigns magnetic domains of the permalloy film on each set and reset increasing the 
sensitivity. The master pulsed signal also pass through diodes, resistor, inverters and trigger 
the second LM555 (working as mono stable, 10ms output time) to produce delay before 
switch off the UMFG and excite the target. This circuit eliminate all past magnetic history 
of the sensor just before start the measurements.   Figure 4.42 shows the timing diagram of 
signals in different part of the circuit.  
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Figure 4.42. Timing diagrams. 
 
 
Test: sensitivity of time constant  to target shape   
The sensitivity of AMR sensor to samples with differentiated shapes (a base of solder kit, a 
mobile, three pliers, and keys) is analysed. Measurements were taken at 30cm over the 
UMFG. Target responses are plotted in Figures 4.43 and 4.44. The signal measured from 
the AMR in absence of target (blue) is also included for reference.  
  
 
      
The different transient profile of each sample can be observed m re clearly from zoomed 
plot (Figure 4.44). Time constants can be extracted from first part of transient (80-100 s
o
μ ) 
where target signals are dominant.  
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Figure 4.43. Time constant decays profile of metallic objects using AMR HMC1001. 
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Figure 4.44. Close up of Time decay profile of metallic objects using AMR HMC1001. 
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4.6 Conclusions  
 
A new proposal CWD has been proposed based on information contained in the scattered 
magnetic field from objects illuminated by a low frequency magnetic field. Information 
regarding physical characteristics, size and material composition of metallic object can be 
extracted from one of the parameters of the scatter signal: the time constant of the decaying 
magnetic field induced in the object after step excitation.  
The system design discussed and proposed in the second and third part of this chapter can 
serve as foundation for further development of the proposed CWD.  
 
FEA simulations have shown that time decay are sensitive to the shape, size, and material 
composition of the target. Furthermore, the time decay profile is independent of the 
strength of the illuminating magnetic field. Measurements taken in any direction also show 
an agreement in time decay profile. All the mentioned are requirements of a comprehensive 
CWD system, so the results look ising in terms of effectiveness and reduction of false 
alarm
 
Two sensor technologies were chosen to test the feasibility of the proposed CWD system. 
Signals picked up from search coil and magnetoresistive sensor (AMR) technologies 
showed sensitivity to shapes and insensitivity to orientation of metallic objects. 
Measurements were taken in an environment full of electronic equipments where noise and 
EM interference were present.  Search coils showed less immunity to those effects 
comparable to those in AMR. AMR sensors could provide more space resolution detection 
than search coils because of the small size however it can be achieved at cost of complexity 
in the circuitry (i.e. switching circuit, signal conditioning, etc). More investigation is need 
with sensor technologies to provide high resolution and low cost solution for the proposed 
CWD. 
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• This thesis has provided the foundation for development of new proposals on CWD 
and given an input for a comprehensive multimodal weapon detector system free of 
false alarms. 
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Chapter 6: FUTURE WORK AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 work has shown the potential of the time constant as a parameter 
for weapon detection and classification.  The following works could be included in a 
further stage. 
 
• Design specification for the hardware of the CWD. It should include sampling time and 
bit resolution for the acquisition card, and switching frequency for the pulse controller 
such that online detection and classification can be achieved. 
 
• Even though sensing system using search coils and AMR have shown the relatively 
good sensitivity and response, further studies with new low cost sensing technologies 
need to be included to get optimum signals and improve the detection. One of the 
emergent and promising technologies is the two dimensional electron gas, 
AlGaAs/InGaAs/GaAs (Indium Gallium Arsenide/Indium Gallium Arsenide/Gallium 
Arsenide) [48] 2DEG Hall device which could be included in a future work. 
 
• Multi-axis sensor array can be included in the CWD system to have more views of the 
targets and improved detection.  
 
• Implement 3D reconstruction ncealed weapons by means of UMFG modules such 
that resembles a walk through portal. The portal could be comprised of one UMFG 
lying on the floor and two UMFG attached to walls. An algorithm to reconstruct a 3D 
image from sensor array signals, associated with the UMFG modules, needs to be 
developed. 
 
• More investigation needs to be done for multitarget detection and classification. 
 
 
The present stage of this
s 
 of co
 106
 107
• The collection of signal response of different classes of guns, knives and other 
threatening metallic objects to develop signature database. 
 
• The development of robust pattern recognition system with the time constant as a main 
stant extraction and 
line detection and 
sification. 
proaches at several 
oduce an integrated multimodal sensing 
system, reducing the level of false alarms. 
 
 
 
 
 
• Test the sensitivity of the CWD to target material composition. 
 
feature. Efforts need to put in Signal Processing to achieve time con
correlation algorithms with low computation time to ensure on
clas
 
• Finally the present work needs to be complemented with other ap
non-overlapping wavelengths in order to pr
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Appendix A:  Hall Sensor Technology for CWD 
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agnetic field detected at 50cm from the target is very low (in the order of 
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ogy is very cheap and spread in the market. Looking in the ma
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ents exhibit piezoelectric effect, a change in electrical resistance proportional to 
 
Gun/Knife detection from software simulations and practical tests inc
show that m
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sensor technol
sensor device, the P15A from AHS technologies [http://www.ah
sensitive. The next is the design of sensor device using DC techni
magnetic fields as low as 1uT with resolution in the low 100nT. 
 
ents on the IC to minimize the effect of the stress and by using multiple Hall el
Figure 1 show two Hall elements located in close proximity on an IC. They are positioned 
anner so that both experience the same packaging stress. The first elem
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Figure A.1. Offset cancellation. 
A.2 Design 
 
The sensor system (see Figure 2) consists in a current source (LM334), which supply the 
r via a switching circuit for automatic offset cancellation (piezoelectric 
effect). The commutated output from the switching circuit is connected to a low noise 
000 set by one external resistor. A low 
 commutated output 
d into an amplifier 
P15A hall senso
instrumentation amplifier (INA126) with a gain of 1
pass active filter (MAX280) with a cut frequency of 0.1Hz averages the
of the instrumentation amplifier. Finally the filter output voltage is fe
with a gain of 20, which the overall gain of the circuit equal to 20000 (86dB).   
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Appendix B:  Cell Phone Radiation Levels 
 
 
Article published by CNET staff (updated April 21, 2009) 
 
n (CTIA), specific 
io frequency (RF) 
 
urope, the level is 
R level listed in our 
o the ear as tested by the FCC. 
Keep in mind that it is possible for the SAR level to vary between different transmission 
bands and that different testing bodies can obtain different results. Also, it is possible for 
results to vary between different editions of the same phone (such as a handset that is 
offered by multiple carriers). 
 
Table B.1. SAR level of cell phones. 
 
Manufacturer and model SAR level(digital)
 
According to the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Associatio
absorption rate, or SAR, is "a way of measuring the quantity of rad
energy that is absorbed by the body." For a phone to pass FCC certification, that phone's
maximum SAR level must be less than 1.6 watts per kilogram. In E
capped at 2W/kg while Canada allows a maximum of 1.6W/kg. The SA
charts represents the highest SAR level with the phone next t
Motorola V195s 1.6 
Motorola ZN5 1.59 
Motorola VU204 1.55 
Motorola W385 1.54 
RIM BlackBerry Curve 8330 (Sprint) 1.54 
RIM BlackBerry Curve 8330 (U.S. Cellular) 1.54 
RIM BlackBerry Curve 8330 (Verizon Wireless) 1.54 
Motorola Deluxe ic902 1.54 
T-Mobile Shadow (HTC) 1.53 
Motorola i335 1.53 
 
 
